Is Islam an Obstacle to Democratization in the Muslim World?

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, CIVIL LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS SERIES
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Is Islam an Obstacle to Democratization in the Muslim World?

In a 1996 article, Bernard Lewis (53-54) comments that of the 53 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), only Turkey can pass Huntington’s criterion of democracy. This criterion states that a country is democratic when it has made two consecutive, peaceful changes of government via free elections. And he adds that even Turkey’s democracy is in many ways a troubled one.

In a more recent study that examines the findings of the 2001 Freedom House Survey, Adrian Karatnycky (2002: 103) indicates that, “the democracy gap between the Islamic countries and the rest of the world is dramatic. In the 47 countries with an Islamic majority, only 11 (23 percent) have democratically elected governments, while 110 of the 145 non-Islamic states (76 percent) are electoral democracies.” Since the publication of these two articles—in 1996 and 2002, respectively—not much has changed in the Islamic world. To be fair, we must mention some of the recent developments such as Saudi Arabia’s experiment with democracy at the local level, Iraq’s parliamentary elections in January 2005 and constitutional referendum in October 2005, and President Hosni Mubarak’s re-election in a multi-candidate presidential election in September 2005. Although these are welcomed developments in the direction of democracy, they are not enough yet to qualify these countries as democratic even by Huntington’s rather modest “criterion”.

This state of the affairs with respect to the development of democracy in the Muslim world makes one ask if the root cause of the problem is “Islam” itself. At a time when the single superpower of the world embarked upon establishing democracies by force in Muslim-majority countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the question of whether Islam and democracy are compatible with one another gains vital importance. The answer to this question also has very important implications for the Turkic states of central Asia such as Kyrgizistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and others.
With the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, it had been hoped that these states would join the third wave of democratization that had started in 1974 according to Samuel P. Huntington (1993). However, to this day, this hope has not been fulfilled.

There may be several reasons behind this failure, such as the legacy of communism, the low level of social and economic development, and cultural factors, in which Islam has a significant place. However, the fact that the European satellites of Soviet Union made successful transitions to democracy after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc lessens the significance of totalitarian legacy as a factor in explaining the lack of democracy in the Turkic states of central Asia. On the other hand, with regards to social and economic development, although it cannot be dismissed as an important factor in explaining the lack of democracy among the Turkic states, again the fact that there are democratic countries, such as India, that have similar economic conditions to these states reduces the explanatory power of this variable. Also, material conditions of a country can change in time for the better, easing the transition to and consolidation of democracy-if they are the obstacle to democratization. However, the religion of a country, which has an important place in shaping its culture, cannot be changed so easily.

Of course, the religion is also subject to interpretation, and change in a sense. But, the core of the religion- the Koran and the hadith in the case of Islam- is not subject to change. Therefore, if the core of Islam is not compatible with democracy, then Islam may be one of the most important factors that explain the lack of democracy in the Turkic states of central Asia as well.

As a matter of fact, within the Islamic tradition there are scholars such as Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Maududi (1903-79) from the Indian subcontinent and Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) from Egypt, who think that Islam is irreconcilable with the main assumptions of democratic government, and therefore, Islam and democracy are incompatible. If this pessimistic approach with regards to the compatibility of Islam and democracy is right, then the supporters of democracy in the Muslim world are struggling in vain. However, against this pessimistic view, it is possible to put forward both empirical evidence and theoretical arguments that support the view that Islam and democracy are compatible.

Accordingly, there are also those who believe that Islam and democracy are not only compatible but also their association is inevitable within the Islamic world. The examples of this optimistic view about the compatibility between Islam and democracy are Abdul Karim Soroush, a Shi’ite Muslim and a Persian from Iran and Sheikh Rachid al- Ghannaouchi, a Sunni Muslim and a Tunisian Arab.

In the theoretical front, we can take Binder’s (1988: 243-244) distinction between the two sorts of Islamic liberalism or liberal Islam as our starting point. According to both of these interpretations, although for different reasons, Islam and democracy are compatible. For the first branch of Islamic liberalism, it is possible to have a democratic political system in a Muslim society for two reasons. First, such a system is in accordance with the spirit of Islam, which is tolerant of diversity as suggested by the Prophet Mohamed’s statement, “difference of opinion within my community is a sign of God’s mercy.” Secondly, Islam has few or no specific prescriptions regarding the political institutional arrangements of an Islamic society. Thus, in the absence of any specific rules, except for the institution of shura regarding political matters, this first group of Islamic liberals argue, Muslims are free to adopt democratic political arrangements.

However, the second branch of Islamic liberalism aims at justifying liberal democratic arrangements through specific references to Islam. Those who employ this line of justification refer to “explicit legislation such as the qur’anic provision for taking counsel, or the denial of the sovereign authority of man over man, or the shar′i provisions for ‘electing’ the caliph, or the hadith concerning the equality of believers” (Binder 1988: 244). In the words of one of the representatives of this second approach, “Liberal Islam is a branch, or school, of Islam that emphasizes human liberty and freedom within Islam” (Masmoudi 2003: 40). Hence, one of their starting points is one of the basic teachings of Islam: “there can be no compulsion in religion.” The main pillars of this second version of Islamic liberalism are: Hurriya (liberty), Adl (justice), Shura (consultation), and Ijtihad (rational interpretation) (Masmoudi 2003: 40-1).

As examples of this approach, we can refer to Abdul Karim Soroush, a Shi’ite Muslim and a Persian from Iran and Sheikh Rachid al-Ghannaouchi, a Sunni Muslim and a Tunisian Arab. As Wright indicates, these reformers aim to modernize and democratize economic and political systems in an Islamic context. They believe that “human understanding of Islam is flexible, and that Islam’s tenets can be interpreted to accommodate and even encourage pluralism.” (Wright 1996: 67) Unlike Maududi or Qutb, Soroush (1995) thinks that there is no incompatibility between Islam and the freedoms that are the basis of democracy: “Islam and democracy are not only compatible, their association is inevitable. In a Muslim society, one without the other is not perfect” (in Wright 1996: 68). Soroush’s advocacy of democracy for the Islamic world depends on two pillars: First, Soroush (2000: 140-141) believes that,

“faith is a matter of exclusively personal and private experience. We embrace a faith individually just as we confront our death individually. …Faith and love are of the same grain. … There is no such thing as collective adoration, love, and testimony, just as there is no such thing as forced adoration, love, and testimony. True faith is contingent upon individuality and liberty.”

As Wright (1996: 68) rightly suggests, “This freedom is the basis of democracy.” Furthermore, for Soroush, the ideal Islamic state must be based on the beliefs and the will of the majority: An Islamic democracy cannot be dictated from the top; it would not be legitimate unless it has been chosen by the majority, including nonbelievers as well as believers (Wright 1996: 68). In this respect, for Soroush (2000: 129), observing the freedoms and rights that are the bases of democracy makes a government not only democratic, but also religious, i.e. Islamic. Secondly, according to Soroush, our understanding of religion has not reached a point where it is fixed and immutable. Rather it is evolving. Although the sacred texts are immutable, their interpretation is always subject to change because understanding is influenced by the time and place in which believers live (Wright 1996: 68-70).

Ghannouchi (1995) defends an Islamic system with majority rule, free elections, a free press, protection of minorities, equality of all secular and religious parties, and full women’s rights. In this respect, Islam’s function is limited to provide the system with moral values (Wright 1996:73). According to Gannouchi, individual believers are entitled to interpret the Koran for themselves— the right of ijtihad. In Islam there is no one particular authority with the exclusive right of interpretation of the Koran. Also, decisions in an Islamic society must be based on the views of majority and this is secured through the process of shura. In his own words,

“While on the one hand Islam recognizes the right of its adherents to ijtihad in interpreting the Koranic text, it does not recognize a church or an institution or a person as a sole authority speaking in its name or claiming to represent it. Decision making, through the process of shura, belongs to the community as a whole. Thus the democratic values of political pluralism and tolerance are perfectly compatible with Islam.” (in Wright 1996: 72)

Liberal Islam in general makes a distinction between the core of the religion and the historical baggage that has been built up around it over the centuries. As Lewis (1996: 54) points out, when we speak about Islam as a religion, significant distinctions must be drawn: “First, there is what Muslims themselves would call the original, pristine, pure Islam of the Koran and the hadith (the traditions of the Prophet Mohamed) … Second, there is the Islam of the doctors of the holy law, of the magnificent intellectual structure of classical Islamic jurisprudence and theology.” Liberal Muslims tend to base their thinking rather on the original, pristine, pure Islam of the Koran and hadith. As Kubba (2003:46) puts it “[w]hile there are profound sources of Islamic inspiration beyond the Koran-. . .-Islamic authority is the Koran’s alone.”

Regarding the status of the holy law, i.e. shari’a, these liberal Muslims think that we need not be bound by the tradition that is obstructive of development and modernization in the way of democratization. As Lewis (1996: 56) puts it “Muslims believe the holy law to be divinely inspired and guided, yet there are four significantly different school of thought regarding this law.” Given that the authority from which these different traditions are deriving their approaches is one and the same, namely, the Koran, the plurality of these interpretations can be attributed to a great extent to differences of places and times in which these traditions have been developed. Thus, shari’a is, to a great extent, historical. In fact, in order to account for differences in law that were caused by personal interpretation and preferences as well as different social and historical conditions, the doctrine of diversity (ikhtilaf) was developed (Esposito 1998: 321). Kubba (2003: 48-49) draws our attention to this point by stating,

“Take, for example, the role of women—or to be more precise the segregation of men and women that has been practiced so ubiquitously throughout Muslim history. There is no justification at all for this in our religion’s original message. It has come from extra-Islamic cultural sources, been transposed into an Islamic idiom, and labeled with the name of Islam. Again, if we refer to the Koran, I can have one copy and nobody worldwide will disagree with what that copy says. But if we refer to shari’a law there is no holy book called Shari’a.”

In this respect, Muslims should not feel obliged to follow those traditions that hinder them from adapting to both coping with difficulties and ceasing the opportunities of the modern world. Unfortunately, there is not much in the past experiences of Islamic societies that Muslims today can benefit from in this quest. Likewise, as Kubba (2000: 90) points out, “the original texts that define Islam provide general principles on governance and the penal code but do not provide laws for modern societies and states.” It is up to individuals in their roles as citizens to form these rules in a modern world. For example, “thinking about the Medina of old helps us to grasp the political concepts and principles at work during the seedtime of Islam, but in no way can that bygone city provide-nor was it ever meant to provide-a method of running the complex cities, states, and societies in which we live today” (Kubba 2003: 49). Democracy provides the Muslim world with a profound way of running its political affairs. However, in the face of traditions that run against democracy, Muslims should be ready to make necessary changes in these traditions by modernizing them, adapting them, stretching them with a spirit of liberty (Kubba 2003).

On the empirical front, the first evidence for the compatibility of Islam and democracy is the existence of democracy in countries with Muslim majority populations. As indicated at the beginning of this article with a reference to Karatnycky (2002: 103), in the 47 countries with an Islamic majority, there are 11 (23 percent) countries that have democratically elected governments. Though it is troubled in some respects, Turkey’s experience with democracy can be an example of this phenomenon. In Turkey, the political power was transferred to an opposition party (Democrat Party) as a result of democratic elections for the first time on 14 May 1950. Since then, Turkey has witnessed three military interventions in 1960, in 1971 and in 1980. However, direct military rule has been an exception rather than the rule in Turkish politics since 1950.

However, there may be those who argue against this by stating that democracy took root in Turkey only after Islam was excluded from the public realm. For example, this line of thought can be found in Sanford Lakoff (2004: 134-135):

“…it is misleading to identify Turkey simply as a ‘Muslim-majority country’ if the aim is to show that Islamic belief is compatible with democracy. Turkey’s republican constitution was adopted as part of a secularist revolution in the early 1920s that decreed an end to the traditional religio-political offices of sultan and caliph, along with religious courts and schools. Since then, Islamist parties have found themselves forcibly suppressed or compelled to respect secularism. Surely the more relevant implication of the Turkish experience is that Islamic beliefs may have to be overridden or be denied embodiment in social and political institutions if democracy is to rise in Muslim-majority countries . . .”

Luckily, we do not need to accept Lakoff’s idea readily. Accordingly, Turkey’s experience with democracy did not start with the establishment of the Republic but goes back to Ottoman Empire. First, between December 1876-February 1878, and second, between July 1908-January 1913, Turkey experienced a constitutional parliamentary regime (Zurcher 1997; Erdoğan 1999a: 31). Thus, it was possible to introduce democracy in Turkey even before the secularist revolution of the early 1920s.

Additional empirical evidence in favor of the argument that Islam is not an obstacle to democracy can be found in the emergence of what Vali Nasr (2005:12) calls “in a conscience evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe-‘Muslim Democracy’”. To the extent that Muslim democracy does not rest on “an abstract, carefully thought-out theological and ideological accommodation between Islam and democracy”, the Muslim democrats reconcile themselves with the requisites of democracy in a pragmatic way (Nasr 2005: 15). This trend has been evident since the early 1990 s in the countries such as Turkey, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia where Islamic-oriented but not Islamist parties have had electoral successes. The Justice and Development Party in Turkey, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in Bangladesh, and the United Malays National Organization in Malaysia are examples of this phenomenon.

A peculiar fact about the democratically elected governments in the Muslim world is that none of them exists in the Arab world. As Karatnycky (2002:104) stated: “Of the 31 non-Arab Islamic countries, 11 are electoral democracies, while none of the 16 majority-Arab countries has a democratically elected government.” In parallel to Karatnycky, Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson (2004: 141) show that

“a non-Arab Muslim majority country was almost twenty times more likely to be ‘electorally competitive’ than an Arab Muslim majority country.” They reached this conclusion by analyzing the data covering the period between 1973 and 2002 from the standpoint of the presence of electoral competitiveness4. These findings bring up the following question: “Can it be possible that the lack of democracy is not related with being a Muslim state, but rather with being an Arab state?” Indeed, Stepan and Robertson titled their 2003 article “An Arab More Than ‘Muslim’ Electoral Gap” and 2004 article “Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism”.

This peculiar fact makes one think that in addition to the pessimistic interpretation of Islam, which rejects democracy, socio-economic, international, and cultural factors, which are not directly related with Islam, might be responsible for the lack of democracy in the Arab world. To the extent that other Muslim countries that lack democratically elected governments also share some of these factors, the Arab experience may be worth to considering more closely. With this idea in mind, let us now examine the Arab exceptionalism.

…….to be continued

Dr. Bican SAHIN
Assistant Professor, Hacettepe University Vice President, Association Of Liberal Thinking