ONLINE JIHADISM FOR THE HIP HOP GENERATION: MOBILIZING DIASPORIC MUSLIM YOUTH IN CYBERSPACE
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Prior to the widespread dissemination of the Internet and other forms of computer mediated communication, the vast majority of Muslims in the West had very little if any sustained interaction with pan-Islamic fundamentalist movements originating in the Middle East and South Asia. Recent years have witnessed a proliferation of new transnational networks linked to such movements, fuelled in part by enhanced levels of information exchanges and contact among Muslim teens and young adults in cyberspace. In particular, many Muslim teens and young adults have been heavily influenced in their collective identity formation by various theological and political perspectives found online.
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Prior to the widespread dissemination of the Internet and other forms of computer mediated communication, the vast majority of Muslims in the West had very little if any sustained interaction with pan-Islamic fundamentalist movements originating in the Middle East and South Asia. Recent years have witnessed a proliferation of new transnational networks linked to such movements, fuelled in part by enhanced levels of information exchanges and contact among Muslim teens and young adults in cyberspace. In particular, many Muslim teens and young adults have been heavily influenced in their collective identity formation by various theological and political perspectives found online.
Pan-Islamic movements with a presence on the web ranging from those promoting peaceful coexistence to militant Jihadism have become significant identity markers for a growing number of Muslim young people living in diaspora (i.e geographically separated from traditional Islamic homelands in the Middle East and South Asia. Western popular culture has played a major role in the socialization of such youth, with hip-hop being particularly influential in this regard.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES
In order for any social (or socio-religious) movement to gain active supporters, an awareness of collective identity must first emerge. Based primarily on the shared experiences of everyday life, collective identity refers to “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution.
As Manuel Castels explains, collective identities involve “the process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute or related set of attributes, that are given priority over other sources of meaning” Though perceptions of collective identity typically impact and affect one’s personal identity, individual feelings alone cannot engender a collective identity as such. Rather there must be a shared identification that extends beyond the self and encompasses some sort of communal orientation,
Specific social phenomena do not become meaningful to individuals until they have been framed. i.e socially and cognitively organized as part of a discourse. Activists frequently attempt to mobilize prospective participants by linking a given movement’s frames with those of a sympathetic audience. Such “frame alignments” involve the micro-mobilization of potential recruits by appealing to a familiar set of symbols, beliefs, values, rituals, and narratives that resonate with individualized conceptions of social norms(Snow et al 1986:211) The identification of a tangible enemy through the framing process is a necessary ingredient in developing an individual’s collective consciousness.
Computer-mediated forms of communication are ideal for framing purposes, given the deliberative and often targeted dissemination of text, images, video and sound online. As an inherently polycentric and interconnected technology, the internet enables activists to easily frame and disseminate views to geographically dispersed individuals with common interests and concerns.
GLOBALIZING JIHADISM
The subterranean structure of the internet is tailor made for the diffusion of relatively decentralized socio-religious movements such as pan-Islamism and its militant offshoot, Jihadism. As Bunt(2003:11) explains, online expression and interaction have directly influenced the negotiation and formation of new transnational Islamic identities. As he states, “The Internet has not superseded traditional forms of political expression, but is a means through which conventional boundaries and barriers can be transcended.” More specifically, Roy notes that cyberspace has provided an opening for the coalescence of a global neo-fundamentalist movement that promises to “reconstruct a Muslim community based solely on Islamic tenets”(2003:29-30)
The subterranean structure of the internet is tailor made for the diffusion of relatively decentralized socio-religious movements such as pan-Islamism and its militant offshoot, Jihadism. As Bunt(2003:11) explains, online expression and interaction have directly influenced the negotiation and formation of new transnational Islamic identities. As he states, “The Internet has not superseded traditional forms of political expression, but is a means through which conventional boundaries and barriers can be transcended.” More specifically, Roy notes that cyberspace has provided an opening for the coalescence of a global neo-fundamentalist movement that promises to “reconstruct a Muslim community based solely on Islamic tenets”(2003:29-30)
In contrast to the relatively progressive and humanitarian vision of Islam favoured by many moderate Muslims, Jihadists tend to embrace an extremely fundamentalist Sunni sect known as Salafism, which first emerged in 18th century Arabia. As a revivalist movement, Salafism is committed to restoring what it claims are the original precepts of the faith. The movement also tends to romanticize the Caliphate (i.e., the defunct Islamic multinational theocratic state that for centuries incorporated much of the Middle East and North Africa) and seeks its restoration in the contemporary era.
The modern history of the transnational Jihadist movement can be traced back to the Afghan war of the late 1970’s and 80’s, With the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan as a rallying point, the Salafi-influenced resistance movement known as the mujahedeen emerged. As militant Muslim Arabs flocked to Afghanistan to fight “godless” communists, new socio-religious networks were formed that linked mujahedeen – regardless of their disparate national origins. After the Afghan war ended in the late 1980s the vast majority of mujahedeen Arabs did not return to their home countries. Osama bin Laden and other mujahedeen quickly shifted their focus to Western powers (“the far enemy”) that were framed as a more immediate “threat” to Islam. Significantly, such neo-fundamentalist ideologues depicted Jihad as “a permanent and personal religious duty” (Roy 2004:68,254)
In the years immediately preceding the attacks of September 11, 2001, a number of web sites acting as “front operations” for Al-Qaida and related Jihadist/Salafi groups emerged. One notable example was the Center for Islamic Studies and Research that disseminated encrypted and embedded messages to would be terrorists and other supporters. The site, which was entirely in Arabic, also promoted strong anti-American sentiments and featured commentary, poetry and streaming audio and video glorifying the September 11th attacks.
Since 9-11, there has been an exponential increase in the number of radical Jihadist/Salafi websites. English language sites in particular have become increasingly commonplace, with a wide array of material posted online including everything from inflammatory sermons by radical sheiks to video clips of roadside bomb blasts and hostage beheadings. This ostensibly “authentic” form of Islam has proven to be particularly appealing to a growing number of young alienated Muslims and prospective converts to radical Islam in the West.
RE-ISLAMIZATION OF MUSLIM YOUTH
Over the past several decades, large waves of Muslim migrants seeking economic opportunities and/or escaping political turmoil have altered demographic status quo of many countries in Europe and North America. The religion of diasporic Muslim youth has invariably impacted their identity as well as their norms, values, argot, and interpersonal relations within a given “host” society. In contrast to their elders, many in the new generation of Western-born and educated Muslims consider their religion to be significantly more important as an identity marker than any specific ethnicity, nationality, or citizenship status.
Many young Muslims seem to be searching for “a more authentic form of Islam that the one their parents practice”(Benjamin and Simon 2006:120). Pan-Islamic and neo-fundamentalist versions of Islam have gained new sources of support as a result of this generational religious revival (Roy 2004:2)
Responding to feelings of isolation and the loss of ethno-national social bonds while living in diaspora, Muslim youth increasingly have sought out co-religionists around the world for support. Various forms of social networking have also facilitated the construction of reactive collective identities among diasporic Muslims (Roy 2004:45). As a Muslim American college student from Chicago explained: I am more religious than my father because I have the luxury of thinking about my faith, I discovered Islam when I became involved in the campus mosque...Our new awareness is also a reaction to the treatment of Muslims in this country. After 9-11 older generation who ran the show thought it best to lie low, as that happened, the younger generation was uncomfortable with this, especially at colleges and universities. We decided we must become active.
For many young devout Muslims living in the West, the preferred course of action is to become involved in non-violent campaigns designed to combat Islamophobia and American intervention in Iraq. However, other young Muslims are apparently receptive to many of the extreme ideas and tactics popularized by the Jihadist movement. Though Muslim Americans of Middle Eastern or South Asian descent are relatively assimilated and affluent compared to their ethno-religious cohorts in Western Europe, a growing number of Muslim American teens and young adults are becoming militantly anti-Western, according to a recent poll.
CONSTRUCTING THE CYBER UMMAH
Virtually all of the modern pan-Islamic movements have invoked the language of the Ummah (i.e.,”the community of believers”) Given the fragmentation that has plagued Islam for Centuries, there is a very strong emphasis among Muslims for some type of unification of the faith. Most moderate proponents of the Ummah frame the concept in an idealized metaphysical context that would include virtually all Muslims worldwide, while others (particularly neo-fundamentalists) have a much more narrow and hegemonic definition. For Salafi/Jihadists, the ummah is essentially a metaphor for the purification of the faith and the reestablishment of a pan-Islamic Caliphate.
In perusing numerous MySpace profiles of diasporic Muslim teens and young adults,
In perusing numerous MySpace profiles of diasporic Muslim teens and young adults,
I found repeated references to an idealized ummah. For instance, a 28yr old Tennessee woman going by the profile name “Love of Islam” expressed her deep affection for the ummah. Sounding very inclusive, she listed numerous nationalities of Muslims and professed that “I love you and I would die for you” However, she also expressed deep concern about the ummah’s fragmented character and the need for greater Muslim unity, particularly in the face of rising hostility to Islam. She asked Allah to “please bring our ummah together so that we may be one and stand against the unbelievers in our time of need.”
In contrast to such relatively moderate calls for pan-Islamic unity, other diasporic Muslims advocate a much more narrow description of the ummah. “Fez, a 21yr old self-described Salafi, states on his site that he opposes any additions, deletions or alterations to Islam. Fez maintains that Islam should be based solely on the writings and teachings of Mohammad and the earliest pious pioneers of the faith. The Salafi viewpoint he explains is not simply a sect or movement within Islam, rather it is True Islam and refers to contemporary Salafis as true believers of the faith and notes that anyone who does not follow the Salafi path will be excluded from the ummah and subsequently face eternal damnation.
FRAMING JIHAD ONLINE
One of the most significant disputes among Muslims today concerns the concept of Jihad, with mainstream and neo-fundamentalist factions defining the concept in markedly different ways. The Arabic word Jihad roughly translates as “struggle” or “striving” and is often classified by Muslims as either internal or external. In this respect, there are competing Islamic discourses about Jihad, with neo-fundamentalists often emphasizing the need for an external holy war against non-Muslim infidels, while more moderate Muslims are more apt to portray Jihad primarily as a personal strategy for overcoming evil.
Though more moderate Muslims often acknowledge that a military-style jihad is appropriate in certain situations, they narrowly define its parameters. For example, several MySpace bloggers make the argument that Islam is a “religion of peace” and that all forms of violence and aggression are prohibited except in cases of “self-defence”.
In contrast, militant Jihadists retort that a violent holy war against the West is absolutely necessary given the current state of world affairs.
HIP HOP G-HAD
The globalization of hip-hop has resulted in ethnonational appropriations that vary substantially from the original African American model. In this sense hip-hop has undergone a “recontextualization” process in which cultural objects are “borrowed” from one social context for the purpose of applying them to another. Lull refers to this global/local process as the “hybridization” and Indigenization” of rap, contending that American-style hip-hop is often fused with other cultural discourses (eg pan-Islamic themes) to produce distinctly new style formations.
Like many Muslim hip-hop bands, Fun-Da-Mental has their own MySpace music site that features Islamic-centric songs as “Blood in Transit” and “Repent”. While not endorsing terrorism per se, their lyrics and public statements often seem to rationalize the use of such tactics by Jihadists.
Like many Muslim hip-hop bands, Fun-Da-Mental has their own MySpace music site that features Islamic-centric songs as “Blood in Transit” and “Repent”. While not endorsing terrorism per se, their lyrics and public statements often seem to rationalize the use of such tactics by Jihadists.
Not surprisingly, over half of the Muslim personal profile pages examined on MySpace include hip-hop music and/or video, often recontextualized for a radical Muslim audience.
Several MySpace group sites include the word “jihad” in their title, often mixed with hip-hop slang and style. Among the top members listed in the Muslimz group page is “Azzi,” a 27yr old North Dakotan whose face is completely masked with only his eyes revealed. Like many radical Muslims on MySpace, he says he would like to meet other mujahedeen. On his page, he displays photos of guns and a Muslim man behind bars identified as Shiek Omar AbdelRahman, who is currently serving a life sentence for seditious conspiracy in helping plan the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
A common tactic found on many radical Jihadist profiles is to take an existing concept such as “support our troops” or “I pledge allegiance” and reframe it in a new or innovative way, particularly as a means for disrupting the traditional American meaning of a given phrase.
FRAMING THE ENEMY
Several MySpace profiles examined include militant Muslim rap songs referring to kuffars as the main enemy of Islam. For example, Soldiers of Allah, a Los Angeles based Arab American hip-hop band, has a site featuring an album cover with a lone soldier on horseback holding a black flag as a large moon shines in the background. The song “Bring back Islam” is featured and includes numerous pan-Islamic references such as calls to eradicate national borders that separate Muslims.
One of the most important innovations of MySpace and YouTube is that relatively new or unsigned artists are able to disseminate their work to a potentially large audience. In the past, such artists would be much more confined in terms of audience exposure, particularly if they lacked a record deal or were not touring extensively. Numerous diasporic Muslim hip-hop artists examined in this study fit into this category.
One of the most important innovations of MySpace and YouTube is that relatively new or unsigned artists are able to disseminate their work to a potentially large audience. In the past, such artists would be much more confined in terms of audience exposure, particularly if they lacked a record deal or were not touring extensively. Numerous diasporic Muslim hip-hop artists examined in this study fit into this category.
CONCLUSION
Diasporic Muslim youth are undergoing a profound transition, being buffeted by conflicting social trends. On the one hand, they are products of Western societies that reward economic achievement and educational attainment. But on the other hand, they are increasingly being cast as racialized outsiders and “dangerous foreigners,” particularly in the aftermath of 9-11. Largely circumventing traditional Islamic religious hierarchies, virtual communities of diasporic Muslim you have formed around the world.
MySpace in particular has facilitated the growth of such networks. In contrast to most other websites, MySpace has higher levels of accessibility for the youth market, broader networking capabilities and a much more individualized approach to online expression.
Such a dialectical synthesis of public and private spheres provides the wherewithal for the micro-mobilization of socio-religious movement adherents. Recontextualizing a message for a specific individual becomes relatively simple. Much of the jargon associated with Jihadism is already in the vernacular of non-mobilized Muslim youth.
The challenge for Jihadists is to connect pre-existing frames with the movement’s emotional, ideological and cultural sentiments.
Social networking sites such as MySpace provide an existing online infrastructure in which violent Jihadism can be framed merely as another form of “youthful rebellion,” one that could be perceived as “cool” by susceptible youth due in part to its novel venue.
by:
David Drissel
The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences
Volume 2, Number 4
David Drissel
The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences
Volume 2, Number 4
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