SLAM, DEMOCRACY, CIVIL LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS SERIES
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Explaining The Arab Exceptionalism:
Various explanations can be offered for this empirical discrepancy of democratic credentials in the Arab world. One line of explanation is concerned with socio-economic development. In fact, most of the Muslim majority countries are in less developed parts of the world. As a part of this larger Muslim world, many Arab countries have a bad record of socioeconomic development.
Going back to Seymour Martin Lipset’s 1959 article, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, it can be argued that in most of the Arab countries the level of socio economic development is not high enough to sustain a democratic form of government. As will be remembered, Lipset argued that socio-economic development, i.e. modernization, creates a middle class that is at peace with the main institutions of the political system. Furthermore, modernization makes the working class less authoritarian by giving it a stake in the system such as a stable income and the hope of climbing the ladder of social standing. Thus, he concluded that although socio-economic development does not guarantee democratic government, it helps sustain it.
Indeed, as Kubba (2000) indicates, after they gained their independence from the Ottoman Empire with the help of European colonialists, Arab states experimented with democracy for the first time in their history. At that time, governments followed constitutional and legal procedures but failed to address the needs of the worse off sections in their societies. Despite the fact that a political system that is open to all citizens existed, high illiteracy rates hindered masses from taking part in politics. A combination of this lack of participation and the slow pace of social and economic development caused democracy to remain an urban phenomenon that mostly served the interests of the elite and thus to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the poor.
The events that took place in the aftermath of World War II gave a further impetus to the collapse of democracy in the Arab world. First, the establishment of the state of Israel had caused nationalism and political radicalism to rise. Second, competing superpowers did not care about democracy rather about their vital interests in the region and thus gave a blank check to the military officers.
Confident with the encouragement given by the competing superpowers, military officers benefited from this climate of low legitimacy of democratic government and rampant nationalism, and put an end to democratic governments. Thus, bureaucratic-authoritarian governments were introduced first into Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and then to most of the Arab world through popularly supported military coups (Kubba 2000: 85-86).
At this point, one can think of economically well-to-do Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf sheikhdoms. Despite the fact that they are doing very well economically these states have not experienced any democratic government. What explains this? As pointed out above, Lipset did not argue that social and economic development lead to political democracy. Likewise, Phillips Cutright and James Wiley (1969) can give us theoretical insight about this puzzle. In their study covering 40 nations within the time period from 1927 to 1966, Cutright and Wiley confirmed the positive correlation between economic development and democracy that was advanced by Lipset earlier.
The originality of their study was the finding that those countries with a high level of economic development and high social security services could continue without democracy if they wanted to. In other words, as long as the state could satisfy the economic demands of the citizens such as jobs, health care, housing, etc., citizens did not feel a strong need to have a say in decision making. Thus when one thinks about the fact that oil-rich countries of the Arab peninsula provide most of these services and plus do not need taxes to finance them, then, the proverb ‘No taxation, no representation’ makes clear sense.
As Karatnycky (2002: 105) indicates “oil-rich Muslim states have used oil revenues to provide large subventions to their populations, creating a unique form of public welfare that reinforces idleness and suppresses initiative.” A second negative impact of the riches that are generated through oil on democratization among the Arab states is that it prevents the emergence of entrepreneurial and working classes respectively. As shown by numerous scholars such as Barrington Moore (1993) and Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), the emergence of democracy depends on the existence of social classes that demand it. Stated differently, the Arab states that are rich achieved prosperity without capitalist development. Additionally, the lack of a vibrant market economy causes the absence of a lively civil society. The simple reason for this is that in the absence of a developed market economy, civil society groups cannot gain easily economic independence from the state. Where the main income source for individuals and groups is the state, the state can be criticized only to the extent that it allows.
Another factor that is related to the collapse of democracy and the entrenchment of authoritarian governments in the Arab world is concerned with cultural dimension. The crux of the argument that sees a direct relationship between a given country’s culture and its democratic prospects is that in order for democracy to work properly in a given society, there must be a cultural background that is suitable for democracy in that particular country. Thus, in The Civic Culture, 1963, Almond and Verba argue that a political culture with a mixture of both participative and deferential components would have a more suitable climate for democracy (in Peters 1998: 45). In contrast, solely participative or subject-oriented cultures would be less suitable for democracy.
However, as Kubba (2000: 86) points out, “patriarchal Arab societies, accustomed to strong chiefs, had little appreciation for the slow process and competing authorities of democratic rule.” Using Almond and Verba’s classification, we can conclude that when democracy collapsed in the Arab world, Arab societies had a rather subject-oriented political culture. In addition to the social-economic and cultural factors, a third factor has its roots outside the region, i.e., in the capitals of the major powers of the world. As suggested with reference to the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in the aftermath of World War II, the superpowers openly supported military officers in staging military coups in the Arab countries. During and even after the Cold War those major powers continued to support authoritarian regimes for the sake of maintaining stability in the region that is indispensable for their national interests.
Thus, Radwan Masmoudi (2003: 43) states that, “the United States and European countries must stop supporting the dictators in the name of stability. We all know that the stability provided by dictators is an illusion that only breeds violence and extremism.” Indeed, the unfolding of events following September 11, 2001 caused the only superpower of the world to change its policy towards the Middle East. Accordingly, the US government and its main ally, the UK, embarked on a project called Greater Middle East Initiative, the primary purpose of which is to promote democracy in the region.
In conjunction with the factor of stability, authoritarian regimes of the Arab world have been playing the card of Islamic fundamentalism and terror, especially since the end of the Cold War. These regimes have used the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as a justification for their heavy-handed rule in the eye of the international community. They argue that if they loosen the harnesses a little bit, the Islamists will take the power and this, in turn, will destroy the stability and peace in the region (Kubba 2000: 89; El-Affendi 2003: 37).
One of the instruments that these regimes have employed in justifying their undemocratic measures has been the press. As Kubba (2000:89) reports, “the official press gives maximum publicity to radical and violent groups, portraying political Islam as a bogeyman that justifies undemocratic measures ...” Thanks to this manipulated propaganda, these regimes were able to lump all Islamic groups in the category of fundamentalist Islam and to exclude them from social and political participation (Kubba 2000; Masmoudi 2003).
As Masmoudi (2003: 42) points out, “these states often do not distinguish between the liberal and fundamentalist Islam, they tend to perceive religion itself as a threat.” Thus, in combination with a pessimistic interpretation of the relationship between Islam and democracy, there are factors that can be grouped as social and economic, cultural, and international factors that can be employed to explain the lack of democratic government in the Arab world. Of course, there may be some other factors that have not been accounted for in this limited space, yet none that have been discussed here are related to the essence of Islam. Stated differently, these are all secular, temporal factors.
In this respect, they are not immutable. In fact, a long way has been traveled in the direction of modernization in the past few decades in the Arab world. There has been important progress in social, economic, and educational fronts (Kubba 2000: 88).
Hence, it would not be misleading to conclude that Arab countries are overcoming all the barriers that stand in the way of democratization one by one. It can be reasonably expected that in the near future, transitions to democracy will be achieved in this part of the world as well.
Conclusion
========
This article raised one particular question: Is Islam an obstacle to democratization in the Muslim world? At the very beginning, it was pointed out that there are those who think that Islam rejects democracy with its notion of popular sovereignty. For them, the sovereignty belongs to God. Therefore, one can think, the lack of democracy in the Islamic world can be explained by the absence of any notion of democratic government in Islam. However, this pessimistic view for the fortunes of democracy in the Muslim world does not go unchallenged.
It is possible to advance both empirical evidence that there are democratic countries with majority-Muslim populations and theoretical arguments that Islam and democracy are not only compatible, but their association is inevitable. The optimistic view about the compatibility of Islam and democracy makes a distinction between the core of the religion and historical baggage that has been built around it over the centuries. On the basis of this distinction, it claims that those who argue against democracy in the name of Islam are depending on the historical baggage rather than the core of Islam. There is nothing in the core of Islam that hinders the establishment of democracy.
In fact, as it was shown in explaining the lack of democracy in the Arab world, in combination with a pessimistic interpretation of the relationship between Islam and democracy, social, economic and cultural factors that are not related to Islam can be identified as the factors that hinder the development of democracy. However, this also shows that in order to establish democracy in the Muslim world, it is not enough to show that Islam is compatible with democracy, rather, there must be a social, economic, and cultural environment that is fit for democracy. In this direction, if democracy is going to take root in Islamic soil, both the interpretation that emphasizes the compatibility of Islam and democracy, and the social, economic, and cultural conditions must be advanced.
Dr. Bican SAHIN
Assistant Professor, Hacettepe University Vice President, Association Of Liberal Thinking
==============================
Explaining The Arab Exceptionalism:
Various explanations can be offered for this empirical discrepancy of democratic credentials in the Arab world. One line of explanation is concerned with socio-economic development. In fact, most of the Muslim majority countries are in less developed parts of the world. As a part of this larger Muslim world, many Arab countries have a bad record of socioeconomic development.
Going back to Seymour Martin Lipset’s 1959 article, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, it can be argued that in most of the Arab countries the level of socio economic development is not high enough to sustain a democratic form of government. As will be remembered, Lipset argued that socio-economic development, i.e. modernization, creates a middle class that is at peace with the main institutions of the political system. Furthermore, modernization makes the working class less authoritarian by giving it a stake in the system such as a stable income and the hope of climbing the ladder of social standing. Thus, he concluded that although socio-economic development does not guarantee democratic government, it helps sustain it.
Indeed, as Kubba (2000) indicates, after they gained their independence from the Ottoman Empire with the help of European colonialists, Arab states experimented with democracy for the first time in their history. At that time, governments followed constitutional and legal procedures but failed to address the needs of the worse off sections in their societies. Despite the fact that a political system that is open to all citizens existed, high illiteracy rates hindered masses from taking part in politics. A combination of this lack of participation and the slow pace of social and economic development caused democracy to remain an urban phenomenon that mostly served the interests of the elite and thus to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the poor.
The events that took place in the aftermath of World War II gave a further impetus to the collapse of democracy in the Arab world. First, the establishment of the state of Israel had caused nationalism and political radicalism to rise. Second, competing superpowers did not care about democracy rather about their vital interests in the region and thus gave a blank check to the military officers.
Confident with the encouragement given by the competing superpowers, military officers benefited from this climate of low legitimacy of democratic government and rampant nationalism, and put an end to democratic governments. Thus, bureaucratic-authoritarian governments were introduced first into Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and then to most of the Arab world through popularly supported military coups (Kubba 2000: 85-86).
At this point, one can think of economically well-to-do Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf sheikhdoms. Despite the fact that they are doing very well economically these states have not experienced any democratic government. What explains this? As pointed out above, Lipset did not argue that social and economic development lead to political democracy. Likewise, Phillips Cutright and James Wiley (1969) can give us theoretical insight about this puzzle. In their study covering 40 nations within the time period from 1927 to 1966, Cutright and Wiley confirmed the positive correlation between economic development and democracy that was advanced by Lipset earlier.
The originality of their study was the finding that those countries with a high level of economic development and high social security services could continue without democracy if they wanted to. In other words, as long as the state could satisfy the economic demands of the citizens such as jobs, health care, housing, etc., citizens did not feel a strong need to have a say in decision making. Thus when one thinks about the fact that oil-rich countries of the Arab peninsula provide most of these services and plus do not need taxes to finance them, then, the proverb ‘No taxation, no representation’ makes clear sense.
As Karatnycky (2002: 105) indicates “oil-rich Muslim states have used oil revenues to provide large subventions to their populations, creating a unique form of public welfare that reinforces idleness and suppresses initiative.” A second negative impact of the riches that are generated through oil on democratization among the Arab states is that it prevents the emergence of entrepreneurial and working classes respectively. As shown by numerous scholars such as Barrington Moore (1993) and Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), the emergence of democracy depends on the existence of social classes that demand it. Stated differently, the Arab states that are rich achieved prosperity without capitalist development. Additionally, the lack of a vibrant market economy causes the absence of a lively civil society. The simple reason for this is that in the absence of a developed market economy, civil society groups cannot gain easily economic independence from the state. Where the main income source for individuals and groups is the state, the state can be criticized only to the extent that it allows.
Another factor that is related to the collapse of democracy and the entrenchment of authoritarian governments in the Arab world is concerned with cultural dimension. The crux of the argument that sees a direct relationship between a given country’s culture and its democratic prospects is that in order for democracy to work properly in a given society, there must be a cultural background that is suitable for democracy in that particular country. Thus, in The Civic Culture, 1963, Almond and Verba argue that a political culture with a mixture of both participative and deferential components would have a more suitable climate for democracy (in Peters 1998: 45). In contrast, solely participative or subject-oriented cultures would be less suitable for democracy.
However, as Kubba (2000: 86) points out, “patriarchal Arab societies, accustomed to strong chiefs, had little appreciation for the slow process and competing authorities of democratic rule.” Using Almond and Verba’s classification, we can conclude that when democracy collapsed in the Arab world, Arab societies had a rather subject-oriented political culture. In addition to the social-economic and cultural factors, a third factor has its roots outside the region, i.e., in the capitals of the major powers of the world. As suggested with reference to the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in the aftermath of World War II, the superpowers openly supported military officers in staging military coups in the Arab countries. During and even after the Cold War those major powers continued to support authoritarian regimes for the sake of maintaining stability in the region that is indispensable for their national interests.
Thus, Radwan Masmoudi (2003: 43) states that, “the United States and European countries must stop supporting the dictators in the name of stability. We all know that the stability provided by dictators is an illusion that only breeds violence and extremism.” Indeed, the unfolding of events following September 11, 2001 caused the only superpower of the world to change its policy towards the Middle East. Accordingly, the US government and its main ally, the UK, embarked on a project called Greater Middle East Initiative, the primary purpose of which is to promote democracy in the region.
In conjunction with the factor of stability, authoritarian regimes of the Arab world have been playing the card of Islamic fundamentalism and terror, especially since the end of the Cold War. These regimes have used the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as a justification for their heavy-handed rule in the eye of the international community. They argue that if they loosen the harnesses a little bit, the Islamists will take the power and this, in turn, will destroy the stability and peace in the region (Kubba 2000: 89; El-Affendi 2003: 37).
One of the instruments that these regimes have employed in justifying their undemocratic measures has been the press. As Kubba (2000:89) reports, “the official press gives maximum publicity to radical and violent groups, portraying political Islam as a bogeyman that justifies undemocratic measures ...” Thanks to this manipulated propaganda, these regimes were able to lump all Islamic groups in the category of fundamentalist Islam and to exclude them from social and political participation (Kubba 2000; Masmoudi 2003).
As Masmoudi (2003: 42) points out, “these states often do not distinguish between the liberal and fundamentalist Islam, they tend to perceive religion itself as a threat.” Thus, in combination with a pessimistic interpretation of the relationship between Islam and democracy, there are factors that can be grouped as social and economic, cultural, and international factors that can be employed to explain the lack of democratic government in the Arab world. Of course, there may be some other factors that have not been accounted for in this limited space, yet none that have been discussed here are related to the essence of Islam. Stated differently, these are all secular, temporal factors.
In this respect, they are not immutable. In fact, a long way has been traveled in the direction of modernization in the past few decades in the Arab world. There has been important progress in social, economic, and educational fronts (Kubba 2000: 88).
Hence, it would not be misleading to conclude that Arab countries are overcoming all the barriers that stand in the way of democratization one by one. It can be reasonably expected that in the near future, transitions to democracy will be achieved in this part of the world as well.
Conclusion
========
This article raised one particular question: Is Islam an obstacle to democratization in the Muslim world? At the very beginning, it was pointed out that there are those who think that Islam rejects democracy with its notion of popular sovereignty. For them, the sovereignty belongs to God. Therefore, one can think, the lack of democracy in the Islamic world can be explained by the absence of any notion of democratic government in Islam. However, this pessimistic view for the fortunes of democracy in the Muslim world does not go unchallenged.
It is possible to advance both empirical evidence that there are democratic countries with majority-Muslim populations and theoretical arguments that Islam and democracy are not only compatible, but their association is inevitable. The optimistic view about the compatibility of Islam and democracy makes a distinction between the core of the religion and historical baggage that has been built around it over the centuries. On the basis of this distinction, it claims that those who argue against democracy in the name of Islam are depending on the historical baggage rather than the core of Islam. There is nothing in the core of Islam that hinders the establishment of democracy.
In fact, as it was shown in explaining the lack of democracy in the Arab world, in combination with a pessimistic interpretation of the relationship between Islam and democracy, social, economic and cultural factors that are not related to Islam can be identified as the factors that hinder the development of democracy. However, this also shows that in order to establish democracy in the Muslim world, it is not enough to show that Islam is compatible with democracy, rather, there must be a social, economic, and cultural environment that is fit for democracy. In this direction, if democracy is going to take root in Islamic soil, both the interpretation that emphasizes the compatibility of Islam and democracy, and the social, economic, and cultural conditions must be advanced.
Dr. Bican SAHIN
Assistant Professor, Hacettepe University Vice President, Association Of Liberal Thinking
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